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Project Scope
This report is a review of the fire protection systems installed in the Christopher Cohan Center on the Cal 
Poly, San Luis Obispo campus. The systems reviewed are the passive structural fire protection, passive 
and active egress components, and active detection and suppression systems.   
The report examines whether the reviewed systems in the building meet the prescriptive requirements of 
the 2010 California Building Code1 (CBC) and California Fire Code2 (CFC). The building will be further 
subjected to a performance based analysis. Two design fire scenarios are presented, and an analysis of 
available safe egress time (ASET) is compared with an analysis of the required safe egress time (RSET).
Fire Safety Goals
Five goals found in building guides such as NFPA 5000 and the SFPE Performance Based Design guides 
are as follows:
1. “Provide life safety for the public, building occupants, and emergency responders by minimizing fire-
related injuries and preventing undue loss of life.
2. Minimize damage to property and cultural resources from fire.
3. Provide for continuity of operations. Minimize undue loss of operations and business-related revenue 
caused by fire-related damage. 
4. Limit the environmental impact of fire from combustion products and release of hazardous materials.3”
5. Limit the fire-related damage to buildings and objects of historical and/or cultural significance.
The performance section of this report will focus only on the life safety goal as applied to the building 
occupants.  The prescriptive part of the report will determine if the building is compliant with the 2010 
CBC and CFC, with respect to fire and egress related systems. If it is, then the first goal is assumed to 
have been achieved to a degree equivalent to a new building built to prescriptive code with respect to 
those systems.
The report will not address the remaining goals beyond the following: 
• Survey of construction documents to this point have not revealed systems for managing sprinkler 
discharge or other fire-related environmental hazard mitigation systems. 
• The building is an existing structure with out a protected historical status, so goal 5 does not apply.
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Fire Safety Objectives
The following are the objectives that will determine if the goals listed above have been achieved. The 
performance section of this report will only address the first life safety objective. If the building is 
compliant with the 2010 CBC and CFC, then the life safety objectives will be assumed to have been 
achieved to a degree equivalent to a new building built to prescriptive code with respect to fire and life 
safety systems.
This report will not consider the property damage or continuity of operations objectives.
Life Safety
“Buildings shall be designed and constructed to protect occupants not intimate with the initial fire 
development for the time needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend in place.
Buildings shall be designed and constructed to provide reasonable safety for fire fighters and emergency 
responders during search and rescue operations. 
Buildings shall be designed and constructed to reasonably protect adjacent persons and buildings from 
injury, death, or substantial damage as a result of a fire.
Buildings shall be designed and constructed to provide reasonable access to the building for emergency 
responders.4”
Property Damage
Prevent significant thermal and fire-related contaminate damage to areas outside the room or 
compartment of fire origin.
Prevent significant thermal and fire-related contaminate damage to the Forbes Pipe Organ due to fires not 
originating in the organ’s general location. 
Continuity of Operations
Minimize instances of thermal damage due to fire and fire-related contaminates spreading between 
business areas. For example, keep fire incidents in the main theater from affecting the availability of the 
Phillips Hall classroom. 
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Building Overview
The building is located on the San Luis Obispo campus of the California Polytechnic State University 
(Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4), and was opened in September of 19965. The building’s 
designated number and name are 006 and the Christopher Cohan Center, respectively6. The building is 
also referred to as the Performing Arts Center (PAC), although technically the PAC refers to the 
Christopher Cohan Center as well as the adjacent Alex and Faye Spanos Theater7. This report will refer to 
the building as the PAC.
Figure 1: San Luis Obispo
3
Figure 2: The Cal Poly Campus
4
Figure 3: Location of the PAC
5
Figure 4 shows the adjacent theater that the PAC shares an existing wall with. According to construction 
documents, the wall appears to be of 4-hour rated 10” concrete masonry unit (CMU) construction8. 
The PAC combines a dedicated 1289 seat theater (Sidney Harman Hall) and 4 other primary multipurpose 
areas that are used as meeting rooms, theaters, classrooms, and reception areas9. There are also many 
small rooms such as mechanical rooms, control rooms, offices, dressing rooms, and a kitchen.
The PAC also houses the Forbes Pipe Organ. It is a 20 ton, hand built pipe organ constructed of 2,767 
tin/lead pipes and mahogany casework10. The interior of the organ is protected with a double interlock 
automatic sprinkler system. 
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Figure 4: Google Maps Image of the PAC
Based on floor plans, the PAC consists of 6 levels. In terms of the building code to which it was originally 
built, the 1992 CBC, the PAC is 3 stories with a basement and a mezzanine. Some rooms span multiple 
levels, such as Harmon Hall, which starts at the lower level and is open up to the cat-walk level. The 
tallest open space is the stage, which has about an 81ft clearance between the stage floor and ceiling. 
Overall, the building is about 100ft tall, from basement floor to roof. 
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Prescriptive Analysis
Egress
CBC 1008.1.1 states that the clear width of each door opening shall be sufficient for the occupant load 
thereof and shall provide a clear width of 32 inches. The minimum means of egress door size throughout 
the building is 36 inches, so this requirement is met.
CBC 1009.1 states that the minimum width of stairways shall not be less then 44 inches. The minimum 
widths of stairways in the PAC are 44 inches. 
Basement
The basement and orchestra pit are S occupancies as shown in Figure 5. CBC 1014.2.2.21 states that all 
rooms below grade shall have not less then one exit access that leads directly to an exterior exit door 
opening directly to an exit discharge at grade plane or the public way. The stairway on the left of Figure 6 
fulfills this requirement. Each of the stairways leading from the basement level has a gate at the lower 
level landing that prevents occupants traveling down the stairway from continuing into the basement 
level. 
The lift pits have a range of vertical motion and can be set independently from each other. The three 
primary positions are: basement level as an orchestra pit, seating level to increase seating capacity in the 
hall, and stage level to increase the size of the stage. 
The occupant load, size of areas, and required means of egress size are shown in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Basement Occupancy Classification
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Table 1: Basement Means of Egress
Basement Occupant Load
Area Occupancy Type
Occupant Load 
Determination 
Method
Calculated 
Occupant 
Load
Size 
(sq ft) Exits
Total Exit Width 
(in)
 Basement and 
stage pit S
300 sq ft / 
occupant
Gross  
25 7223
Two 66 inch 
Stairs 132
Required 44
Lower Level
The lower level has B, A-1, A-3, and S occupancy types as shown in Figure 7. This level contains the 
largest fixed seating load of 808, when the lift pits are configured for maximum seating, in Sidney 
Harman Hall (room 101). This level also has the Philips Hall classroom (room 124) and the Pavilion 
(room 128) which is a multi-purpose room often used as a small theater or rehearsal space. 
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Figure 6: Basement Level Exits
2 hour enclosed stair
Figure 7: Lower Level Occupancy Classification
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The main hall has 4 exits, two 72 inch doors (Figure 8)11 and two 44 inch doors (Figure 9)12. 
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Figure 8: Harman Hall Stage View
Main Floor: 808
Dress Circle: 153
Balcony: 169
Gallery: 152
Image by: Malcolm Carlaw
http://www.flickr.com/photos/lightsamples/5555005874/sizes/o/in/photostream/
Figure 9: Harman Hall Seating View
Harman Hall
Max Capacity: 1282
Image by: Malcolm Carlaw
http://www.flickr.com/photos/lightsamples/5555005874/sizes/o/in/photostream/
CBC 1028.2 requires assembly occupancies to have a main exit or multiple main exits distributed around 
the perimeter, one of which must discharge on a street. The construction documents specify that the 72 
inch doors are the main exits, and the one on the right of Figure 8 leads to the two hour exit passageway 
that leads to the street. 
CBC 1028.3 requires other exits with the capacity to serve one half of the occupant load, and at least half 
of the additional exits must discharge to a 1 hour corridor to an exit. As seen in Figure 10, both of the 44 
inch doors discharge into 1 hour galleries that proceed through the main lobby to the exits.
CBC 1015.6 requires at least 2 exits from the stage, one on either side, and the stage has 4 (the fifth door 
shown in the figure along the back of the stage is a roll up door for loading).
CBC 1016.1 allows for up to 250ft of travel distance to an exit because the building is fully sprinklered. 
The entire building is only 200ft wide by 300ft long, so it meets the 250ft allowed travel distance in all 
surveyed locations. This floor has the longest travel distance, from the back rows of the main seating to 
the exits on the main level. 
CFC 1015.1 requires two exits or exit access doorways for occupant loads greater then 49, three exits for 
occupant loads of 501 to 1,000, and four exits for occupant loads in excess of 1,000. A survey of the room 
use designations shows that the building is in compliance. As an example, the dressing rooms are 
classified with the relatively high occupancy load of 15 sq ft per person. The largest of these, rooms 117, 
117A, and 117B have a net area of 713 sq ft, which works out to an occupant load of 48, and so meets the 
one exit requirement. The classroom, rehearsal hall, and lower and upper balconies and lobbies fall into 
the two exits required range, and all pass. The main auditorium has just under 1,000 fixed seats and has 
four exits and so passes as well. Finally, the main lobby requires three exits and has four. 
Table 2 shows the occupant loads and means of egress widths. Required widths are either calculated 
based on the appropriate width per occupant formula given in the CBC or the minimum required by the 
CBC, which ever is greater. 
CBC 303.1, exceptions 2 and 3 state that accessory rooms of 50 occupants or less and areas of 750ft2 or 
less, respectively, be classified as B occupancies or part of the main occupancy. In Table 2 the occupancy 
classification of the dressing rooms are listed as type B occupancy, as would be typical when the building 
is not being used to host an assembly in the main theater. However, the maximum occupant load occurs if 
these are treated as assembly occupancies with tables and chairs, so that basis was used to calculate 
occupant load. 
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Figure 10: Lower Level Means of Egress
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Table 2: Lower Level Means of Egress
Lower Level
Area Occupancy Type
Occupant 
Load 
Determination 
Method
Occupant 
Load
Size 
(sq ft) Means of Egress 
Total Egress 
Width (in)
Harmon Hall 
(main 
auditorium) 
Room 101
A - 1 Number of fixed seats 808 7374
2 Stage Side 72" Doors 144
2 Single 44" Doors 88
Total 232
Required 162
Phillips Hall 
Room 124 A - 3
Number of 
fixed seats 180 2520
1 Door to outside 36
1 Double Door to Exit 
Corridor 72
Required 36
Pavilion Room 
128 A - 3
Net Area 15 
sq ft / person 422 2952
1 Door Exit into Foyer 48
1 Door Exit through 1 hr 
corridor into 2 hr exit 
passageway
48
Required 85
Dressing room 
block: 115 to 
123
B Net area 15 sq ft / person 204 3055
1 Door to outside 42
1 Door to 2 hr exit 
passageway 36
Required 41
Green Room 
Block 109 to 
113
B Net area 15 sq ft / person 84 1257
1 hr corridor 72
2 hr exit passageway 144
Required 17
Kitchen B
Gross area 
200 sq ft / 
person
4 677
36 inch door into 2 hr exit 
passageway 36
Required 32
Front accessory 
block B
Gross area 
100 sq ft / 
person
71 7017
72 inch door into 1 hr 
corridor 72
Two 36 inch doors into 
separate 1 hr corridors 72
Required 32
Stage A - 1 Net Area 15 sq ft / person 269 4034
Two 36 inch doors into 
separate 1 hr corridors on 
opposite sides of the 
stage
64
One 42 inch and one 48 
inch doors into the 2 hr 
exit passageway
90
Required 54
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Main Level
The main level (Figure 11) has type S, A-1, A-2, and B occupancies. The A-2 occupancy is a lobby 
during performances in the main theater. When the main theater is not in use, this area can be rented out 
for purposes that include consumption of food and drink. 
Table 3 shows the occupant loads and the narrowest point of the means of egress widths from the areas on 
the main level. 
16
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Figure 11: Main Level Occupancy Classification
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Figure 12: Main Level Means of Egress
Table 3: Main Level Means of Egress
Main Level
Area Occupancy Type
Occupant 
Load 
Determination 
Method
Occupant 
Load
Size 
(sq ft) Exits
Total 
Exit 
Element 
Width 
(in)
Main Lobby A - 2 Net Area 7 sq ft / person 712 4978
3 sets of two 72 
inch doors to the 
outside
432
1 set of three 72 
inch doors to the 
outside 
216
Required 143
Dress Circle A - 1 Number of fixed seats 153 1967
Two 36 inch 
doors into a 1 hr 
ramp into the 
main lobby
72
Required 64
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Balcony Level
The balcony level has S, A-1, A-2, and B occupancies as well. Again, the A-2 area is a lobby when the 
theater is in use but can be rented out for other assembly purposes when the main theater is not in use. 
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Figure 13: Balcony Level Occupancy Classification
CBC 1028.5 applies to balconies and galleries having a seating capacity of 50 or more. It requires at least 
two means of egress, with one from each side of every balcony and at least one leading directly to an exit. 
The balcony and gallery levels have four 36 inch exits each, the two closest to the stage leading to 2 hour 
enclosed stairs (Figure 14). The exits from the dress circle, balcony, and gallery farthest from the stage 
lead to 1 hour corridors that empty into the lobby area of the respective floor Figure 15. 
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Figure 14: Two Hour Enclosed Stairs
Main Floor: 808
Dress Circle: 153
Balcony: 169
Gallery: 152
Image by: Malcolm Carlaw
http://www.flickr.com/photos/lightsamples/5555005874/sizes/o/in/photostream/
According to the table in CBC 1021.1, the balcony and gallery stories each need two exits. Exit access 
stairways are permitted to provide the minimum number of independent exits if exceptions 3 or 4 of 
1016.1 are met. Exception 4 allows exit access stairways to be used on the first and second stories above 
grade plane if the building is equipped with an automatic sprinkler system. 
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Figure 15: Exits to 1 Hour Corridors
Harman Hall
Max Capacity: 1282
Image by: Malcolm Carlaw
http://www.flickr.com/photos/lightsamples/5555005874/sizes/o/in/photostream/
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Figure 16: Balcony Level Means of Egress
Table 4 shows the occupant loads and means of egress widths for the balcony level.
Table 4: Balcony Level Means of Egress
Balcony Level
Balcony Lobby A - 2 Net Area 7 sq ft / person 460 3214
Two 44 inch 
stairs in the 
center
88
One 73" Stair by 
the Founders' 
Lounge
73
Required (0.3) 138
Balcony A - 1 Number of fixed seats 169 1967
Two 36 inch 
doors into a 1hr 
ramp into the 
lower balcony 
lobby
72
Two 36 inch 
doors into the 2 
hr enclosed 
stairways
72
Required 64
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Gallery Level
Finally, the gallery has S, A-1, A-3, and B occupancy classifications Figure 17. Means of egress are 
illustrated on Figure 18 and occupant load and means of egress widths are shown in Table 5. 
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Figure 17: Gallery Level Occupancy Classifications
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Figure 18: Gallery Level Means of Egress
Table 5: Gallery Level Means of Egress
Gallery Level
Gallery Lobby A - 3 Net Area 7 sq ft / person 298 2081
Two 44 inch 
stairs in the 
center
88
One 45 inch 2 hr 
enclosed stair 45
Required (0.3) 90
Gallery A - 1 Number of fixed seats 152 1967
Two 36 inch 
doors into a 1hr 
ramp into the 
gallery lobby
72
Two 36 inch 
doors into the 2 
hr enclosed 
stairways
72
Required 64
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Structural Protection
According to the construction documents, the PAC was originally built as a type II Fire-Resistive (FR) 
conforming to the 1992 edition of the CBC. Table 6 compares the fire resistance requirements for a Type 
1B building, the closest equivalent to a type II FR, with the actual construction of the building. As is 
shown, the building meets the 2010 CBC requirements for a Type 1B building. 
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Table 6: Construction Requirements
Type 1B As Built
Building Element Rating (hr)
Exterior Load Bearing Walls 2 4
Primary Structural Frame 2 2
Interior Bearing Walls 2 2
Floor Assemblies 2 2
Roof/ceiling assemblies 1 1
Interior Non-Bearing Walls 0 No general specification
Exterior Non-Bearing Walls With 30ft 
or more separation 0 0
Exterior Non-Bearing Walls With less 
then 30ft of separation 1 2
Building Limitations Type 1B As Built
Max area per floor (sf) UL 42,979
Height above grade plane (ft) 160 90
Stories 5 3
Opening Protection (hr)
Exterior Wall Rating Required As Built
1 hour 0.75 0.75
0 hours 0 0
Below is a summary of the structural protection system elements in the PAC. 
Columns
2 hour fire resistance ratings were achieved for steel W columns by adding cementitious sprayed-on 
fireproofing. The UL # x772 design was used. Square and round section steel columns were protected in a 
similar manner using the UL # x771 design.
Beams
2 hours fire resistance ratings for steel W beams were achieved through a combination of cementitious 
sprayed-on fireproofing and concrete slab. The UL # N 706 design was used for the floor beams, while 
UL # S 701 and UL # S715 were used in the roof. 
Floors and Roof
The floors and roof use the same assembly, but with different ratings. They are comprised of a steel 
channel form and steel fiber reinforced concrete. The UL D 916 design is used.
Walls
The walls are composed of either metal channel studs at 16 to 24 inches on center, concrete masonry units 
(CMU), or poured concrete. Additional protection for the steel is generally provided by 5/8” gypsum 
wallboard. The unrated walls have 1 layer of plain wallboard or lath and plaster, while the 1 hour rated 
walls use 1 layer of type X, and the 2 hour walls use 2 layers of type X. 
Many different UL listings are used depending on what the wall is protecting, such as elevator shafts, 
vestibules, or if it is also acting as an acoustical layer. 1 and hour rated designs are: UL #DES 465, UL 
#DES U448, UL #DES U411, and UL DES # 438. 
Steel channel is also used in conjunction with the CMU and concrete walls, in which case layers of 5/8” 
gypsum wallboard are added. 
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In addition to the structural resistance ratings, the following partition ratings were used. Applicable code 
sections are stated:
• Accessory rooms around the stage have 1 hour partitions between them selves
o CBC 410.5.2 dressing rooms, scene docks, property rooms, workshops, storerooms, and 
compartments appurtenant to the stage shall be separated from each other
• There is a 2 hour partition between the stage and the seating, with a drop down fire curtain
o CBC 410.3.4 stages greater then 50 ft in height must be completely separated from the 
seating area by a proscenium wall with not less then a 2 hour fire resistance rating
o CBC 410.5.1 The stage shall be separated from dressing rooms, scene docks, property 
rooms, workshops, storerooms, and compartments appurtenant to the stage and other parts 
of the building by fire barriers
• 1 hour partition ratings in normal corridors
• 2 hours partition rating in the exit passageway
• 1 hour partitions in the elevator lobby
• Openings to the 2 hour exit passageway and enclosed stairs are protected with 1.5 hr door 
assemblies
• All 1 hour corridor opening are protected with 20 minute assemblies
Penetrations
Openings in the 1 hour partitions larger then 16 square inches must be protected to maintain the rating. 
All conduit penetrations are sealed with minimum 2 hour fire resistant sealing. The following UL systems 
were used depending on the partition type:
• UL System # 147 for conduit and conductors in gypsum wallboard
• UL System # 49 or # 233 for conduit in concrete walls
• UL System # 49 for conduit in concrete floors
• UL System # 33, # 149, #204, or #320 for conduit in concrete floors
• UL System # 66 for cable trays in concrete walls
Below, the partition type and fire resistance rating are drawn on the floor plans of the building for the 
basement, the lower level, and the main level. The structure above that is the same as is shown on the 
main level. 
30
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Figure 19: Basement Structural Protection
Channel and wallboard
CMU
Concrete
No rating
1 hour
2 hours
4 hours
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Figure 20: Lower Level Structural Protection
Channel and wallboard
CMU
Concrete
No rating
1 hour
2 hours
4 hours
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Figure 21: Main Level Structural Protection
Channel and wallboard
CMU
Concrete
No rating
1 hour
2 hours
4 hours
Glass
Detection and Notification
CBC 907.2 requires the installation of an approved fire alarm system installed in accordance with NFPA 
72. 
CBC 907.2.1.1 requires the PAC to have an emergency voice/alarm communications system because the 
occupant load is greater then 1,000. CBC 907.5.2.2 requires the voice/alarm system to be designed and 
installed in accordance with NFPA 72.
The PAC appears to use ceiling mounted Notifier E90 speakers as well as wall mounted Notifier E70 
speaker strobes (see attached). The PAC is also equipped with an Emergency Voice Alarm 
Communications System (EVACS). These notification appliances must be checked twice a year.
The PAC is a theater, and so could potentially have a performance with a higher volume level then would 
be safe (110 dBA maximum by NFPA 72 18.4.1.2) to exceed by 5 dBA, as required by NFPA 72 
18.4.3.1. NFPA 72 18.4.1.1 requires the use of visual notification appliances when there is an average 
ambient sound level of greater then 105dBA. NFPA 72 18.4.1.3 states that sound from normal sources 
with a duration of more then 60 seconds shall be included when measuring maximum ambient sound 
levels. It appears to be the case in the PAC that visual signaling is used as the primary notification system, 
with the EVACS providing instructions once the performance is stopped. The PAC complies with NFPA 
72 18.4.3.5 by having a system that can interrupt the performance sound coming from the main speaker 
system, based on section 1.9-A-1-m in construction documents which refer to actuating a contact for the 
Theater Sound System. NFPA 72 18.4.3.5 also requires visible notification appliances to be installed by 
requiring NFPA 72 18.4.3.5.2.
Currently, the fire alarm system in the PAC is controlled by a Notifier NFS-640 fire alarm control panel 
(FACP – see Appendix C) located in room 113. Fire alarm signals from the PAC and other campus 
buildings go to the University Police Department, which is configured as a Remote Supervising Station. 
The PAC’s original fire system used Simplex equipment, most of which was abandoned in place and 
replaced with the current Notifier system.
The PAC currently uses 5 types of alarm initiating devices (see attachment): Notifier FSP-851T 
addressable photoelectric spot type smoke detectors, Notifier FST-851 addressable spot type heat 
detectors, Notifier FSD- 751PL addressable photoelectric type duct smoke detectors, Notifier NBG-12LX 
addressable manual pull stations, and fire sprinklers which subsequently trigger the associated flow 
switch. 
Figure 22 shows the results of a sample determination of compliance based on the layout of the smoke 
detectors. The blue circles denote a 21ft (30ft nominal spacing * 0.7) radius around each detector, 
showing the covered area. 
Except for the upper right corner, the area covered complies with NFPA 72 17.6.3.1.2 (Irregular Areas), 
even without the coverage provided by the detectors in the stair well openings. The ceiling of the upper 
right corner slopes upward as the stairs transition from one level to the next, so that is probably why the 
coverage is sparse in that area.
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Assuming the sample is representative of the overall layout of the system, the PAC complies with NFPA 
72 and therefore the relevant requirements in CBC 907. 
35
Figure 22: Sample of Smoke Detector Spacing
Automatic Suppression
CBC 903.2.1 and 410.6 require the installation of an automatic sprinkler system. CBC 903.3.1.1 requires 
that the sprinkler system be installed in accordance with NFPA 13, with exceptions to this rule given in 
CBC 903.3.1.1.1. Below is an assessment of the sprinkler system installed in the PAC. 
Water Supply
The PAC is supplied by city water main. A 6” pipe supplies the suppression system and contains the 
OS&Y and backflow preventer. This is fed by an 8” main, which is fed by a 10” main which is connected 
to the city line. 
The design flow test lists static pressure at 130psi and residual pressure at 60psi at a flow of 1100gpm. 
Sprinkler Design Criteria
The PAC is divided into three occupancies categories. The offices, classrooms, and the seating areas are 
classified as Light Hazard Occupancies. The sprinkler system has a design density of 0.10gpm/ft^2 with a 
design area of 1500ft^2. Each sprinkler will cover 225ft^2 or less.
The mechanical rooms, storage, and kitchens are classified as Ordinary Hazard Group 1. The sprinkler 
system for this area has a design density of 0.15gpm/ft^2 with a design area of 1500ft^2. Each sprinkler 
will cover 130ft^2 or less.
Finally, the stage and orchestra pit are classified as Ordinary Hazard Group 2. The sprinkler system for 
this area has a design density of 0.20gpm/ft^2 with a design area of 1500ft^2. Each sprinkler will cover 
130ft^2 or less. 
A sample set of hydraulic calculations is shown in Appendix A. The results of the supply and demand are 
shown in Figure 23. Based on this sample, the automatic sprinkler system conforms to NFPA 13.
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance 
The automatic suppression system will be maintained in accordance with NFPA 25. Specific details of the 
requirements can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 23: Sprinkler Demand vs. Capacity
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Other Required Protection Features
Smoke Vents
CBC 410.3.7 requires emergency ventilation for stages larger then 1,000 square feet or taller then 50 feet. 
The PAC's stage exceeds both of these criteria at around 4160 square feet in area and about 81 feet in 
height. 410.3.7 gives two options for emergency ventilation. The PAC uses the 410.3.7.1 option of roof 
vents. The requirement is for two or more vents that open automatically by approved heat-activated 
devices and have a clear area of at least 5 percent of the area of the stage. Manual activation of the vents 
is required as well. 
The PAC has 8 vents installed with an area of about 224 square feet, which comes to about 5.4% of the 
stage area. The vents are activated by fusible links and manual controls. 
Fire Curtain
CBC 410.3.5 requires a fire curtain complying with NFPA 80 when the proscenium wall is required to 
have a fire-resistance rating. The PAC's proscenium wall is required to be 2 hour rated by CBC 410.3.4. 
The fire curtain weighs 40,000lbs and consists of layers of wood and metal13. The fire curtain operates by 
manual activation, a rate of rise heat detector, or fusible link. 
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Special Hazards and Features
Forbes Pipe Organ
The Forbes Pipe Organ is protected by a double interlock dry pipe automatic sprinkler system. The system 
is triggered by heat detector and loss of pressure due to sprinkler activation.
Kitchen
Room 108 on the lower level has a kitchen. An Ansul range protection system activated by fusible link or 
manual activation is present. 
Pyrotechnics
Pyrotechnic displays are allowed on stage. Pyrotechnic displays require state permits and a licensed 
pyrotechnician. Any open flames require a written permit from the State Fire Marshal14. 
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Prescriptive Summary
Building Code
The PAC appears to conform to the code sections that were investigated for this report. In summary: 
• Proper number and size of exits
• Maximum travel distance to exits is not exceeded 
• Exits have the required protection 
• Required levels of structural protection were specified in the construction documents 
• Required automatic detection, notification, and suppression systems are in place
• Required stage active fire protection components are present
Administrative
There were a few administrative issues spotted on a tour of the PAC. These included objects being stored 
in the enclosed stairways and a rated fire-resistive door propped open with a door stop. Overall, it 
appeared that the building was largely in compliance. 
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Performance Based Analysis
Performance Criteria
The metrics by which the Life Safety objective will be measured are presented below. 
Primary Criteria
Heat Flux
Occupants shall not be exposed to a radient heat flux of 2.5kW/m2 or greater. According to the SFPE 
handbook, sever skin pain occurs in about 1 second of exposure at 2.5kW/m2 of heat flux.
Smoke and gaseous products
If the smoke level or upper layer height remains at least 6 feet above the occupied floor level during the 
time period at which that area of the building may have occupants, as determined by egress models and 
calculations, then no further investigation into gaseous products shall be necessary. If the first criteria has 
failed the following tenability criteria shall be used. 
Secondary Criteria
Maintain at least 10m visibility for illuminated objects as determined by the extinction coefficient method 
in the SFPE Handbook. The farthest distance to an exit from any point on the balconies is about 12m, so 
occupants will have a relatively short distance to travel for the exit to become visible. Additionally, 10m 
visibility decreases the chances of turn back behavior15.
Using the toxic gas model and fractional effective dose (FED) method outlined in the NFPA Handbook, 
occupants shall not reach an FED sufficient to cause incapacitation during their evacuation, relocation, or 
defense in place as determined by egress models and calculations. The dosage limit for carbon monoxide 
(CO) shall be  35,000ppm * min16.
The occupants shall not be exposed to temperatures of 60°C or greater. Purser’s chapter in the SFPE 
handbook states “In practice, 60°C has been found to be the highest temperature at which 100 percent 
water-vapor saturated air can be breathed.17”
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Design Fire Scenarios
The design fire scenarios used for this report are based on those found in NFPA 10118. The NFPA 101 
design fire scenarios are summarized as follows:
1. An occupancy specific fire based on probability of occurrence. 
2. An ultra-fast developing fire in the primary means of egress, with the interior doors open at the start of 
the fire. The purpose is to address a reduction in the number of available means of egress. 
3. A fire starts in a normally unoccupied room and migrates into the room or area with the largest and 
highest concentration of people. 
4. A fire starts in a concealed space that lacks detection or suppression systems adjacent to a large, high 
occupant load room. 
5. A small, smoldering fire that is shielded from detection systems in close proximity to a larger, high 
occupant load room.  This addresses the concern of an undetected fire growing into an unmanageable size 
before action is taken.
6. The most sever fire that could potentially develop based on the largest possible fuel load characteristic 
of the use of the building. 
7. A fire starts outside the building. As there is a building directly adjacent to the PAC, that building may 
serve as the external fire source. 
8. A fire consuming ordinary combustibles in a room with each passive or active fire protection system 
independently rendered ineffective. 
Scenarios 2 and 8 were chosen for this report because they were judged to be challenging scenarios that 
involved the primary occupancy of the building, the main theater. 
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Performance Based Analysis RSET
The performance based analysis will compare the required safe egress time (RSET) with the available 
safe egress time (ASET) for each design scenario. Both design scenarios take place in Harman Hall.
The SFPE Handbook breaks RSET into five periods: td - the time from detection to notification, ta – time 
from occupant notification until occupants decide to take action, ti – time from decision to take action 
until evacuation commences, and te – time from the start of evacuation until it is completed19. 
The portion of RSET measured for both scenarios is the movement time, te. This is measured as the time 
between the start of movement and the exit of the last occupant from the hall on a per level basis. Time 
for td to ti will not initially be accounted for because both scenarios have a high concentration of 
occupants in the area and automatic detection devices were not expected to activate until several minutes 
into the scenario. Therefore, the author judged that the occupants would detect the fire before automatic 
detection devices, but the detection time by the occupants would be too difficult to estimate. The approach 
taken was therefore to determine the required time for occupant exit and leave the detection and pre-
movement time in terms of the margin between exit time and ASET. 
The movement portion of the RSET was calculated by hand using a first order approximation, using 
Thunderhead Engineering’s Pathfinder software in steering mode, and using Pathfinder in SFPE mode 
with basic collisions enabled. The third choice was found to be the most conservative, and was used as the 
movement portion of RSET. The movement times are shown below.
Main Seating – Two 72 inch doors and two 44 inch doors available
•  SFPE method, spreadsheet– 2.5 minutes
•  Pathfinder steering mode – 2.0 minutes
•  Pathfinder SFPE mode, collisions enabled -  2.6 minutes
Main Seating – One 72 inch door unavailable
•  Pathfinder SFPE mode, collisions enabled -  3.9 minutes
Gallery Seating – Four 36 inch doors available
•  Pathfinder SFPE mode, collisions enabled – 1.4 minutes
Gallery Seating – Three 36 inch doors available
•  Pathfinder SFPE mode, collisions enabled – 1.5 minutes
Figure 24 shows an example of the evacuation simulation in progress. 
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Figure 24: Pathfinder Egress Simulation
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Performance Based Analysis ASET
ASET for both scenarios was determined as the time between fire ignition and the limits of tenability 
criteria. Only the gallery seating area and main seating areas were accounted for. The gallery seating is 
the highest, and the maximum occupancy of the next highest seating area, the balcony, is only 17 
occupants, making the RSET essentially the same while ASET is greater. The main area seating area 
holds 656 more occupants, so both RSET and ASET are greater.
Parameters Common to Both Scenarios
Models
The two models used to determine ASET, both from NIST, were the two-zone Consolidated Model of 
Smoke and Fire Transport (CFAST) version 6.1.1.54 and the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) version 5.5.3 with message passing interface (MPI) enabled.
FDS
Boundaries 
The materials simulated in the models were based on construction documents and materials for which 
data was available. The materials and data sources used were: yellow pine, gypsum plaster20, cement, 
Maple, Oak21, and gypsum wallboard22. The stage used layers of wood, while walls were layered materials 
consisting of cement, gypsum, or gypsum plaster, depending upon the construction documents.
Grid Resolution
A referenced study compared sprinkler activation times from experimental data from UL Scoping Test # 1 
to a CFD model with uniform cells varying from 0.5m to 0.125m on a side. The conclusion was “little 
sensitivity to a grid resolution of 0.25m or finer.23” That study opted to use a 0.2m resolution, but the 
computer that ran the simulation for this report lacked sufficient available RAM to support a 0.2m 
resolution. Uniform cells with 0.25m per side were used for these simulations. 
Venting
In order to prevent pressurization, vents are needed in the model. The vertical mesh edges outside the 
seating section of the model were open vents. The exits were opened initially, and the top exits closed 
after the estimated movement time. The 44 inch doors were closed at 500 seconds, which was estimated 
to be when the smoke layer would have descended to around that level. The two 72 inch doors were left 
open for vents. 
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Tenability Calculations
Visibility
Visibility was taken from an optical density point source “device” in FDS. The devices were arranged in 
vertical columns in areas of interest. The point source was multiplied by 2.3 to generate the extinction 
coefficient. 3 or 8, for reflective and light emitting objects, respectively, was divided by the extinction 
coefficient to determine the visibility distance. 
In practice, FDS generated enough flow that the data was erratic, making it difficult to determine if the 
time to the tenability criteria was accurate or more representative of the chance that some optically dense 
gas might travel down and exceed the limit for only a small amount of time while the surrounding gas was 
cooler. A better approach would have been to place several vertical columns of “devices” close to each 
other, so they could be averaged. Due to the long run times, this approach could not be implemented. 
Horizontal slice files of optical density were generated toward the top of the meshes, so the point at which 
visibility was generally lost was able to verified for the gallery seating levels. There were no slice files 
generated for the main seating height. 
Temperature
Temperature data was initially taken from a temperature point source “device” in FDS. The devices were 
arranged in vertical columns in areas of interest. The data was erratic due to the flows of the gas, making 
it difficult to determine if the time to the tenability criteria was accurate or more representative of the 
chance that some hot gas might travel down and exceed the limit for only a small amount of time while 
the surrounding gas was cooler. The columns of devices were not close enough to each other to be 
averaged and still be representative of the points of interest. Instead, vertical temperature slices were used 
to determine the time at which tenability limits were exceeded for the two seating areas in focus. An 
example of temperature determination is shown in Figure 25.
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Carbon Monoxide
CO data was taken from volume fraction point source “device” in FDS. The devices were arranged in 
vertical columns in areas of interest. The data was erratic due to the flows of the gas. In this case, the FED 
model was used, and exposure to the gas was tabulated by concentration during the time interval, so the 
overall time to the tenability limits was probably more representative. Several closely spaced “devices” 
that could be averaged would have been preferable. 
The following equation truncated from the NFPA Handbook was used to determine the tenability limit24. 
An FED of 1 is equivalent to 35,000 ppm * min of CO exposure. The CO volume fraction reported by the 
point source device at each time step and the difference between the time steps were used in the above 
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Figure 25: Determination of Temperature Tenability
equation. The gases are assumed to be ideal and so volume fraction is assumed equal to the molar 
fraction. 
Heat Flux
Heat flux criteria was determined by 2 methods: FDS's radiation transport solver (Figure 26), and by 
using the Lawson and Quintiere Method found in the NFPA Handbook25.
The radiation transport solver predicted similar or smaller heat fluxes then the equation, and was more 
difficult to use, so the equation was used instead. 
The radial distance from the fire at which the heat flux was 2.5kW/m2 was computed at 1 minute 
intervals, and compared with the Pathfinder model. For this case, the model was modified by directing the 
occupants away from the fire by specifying what exits they should proceed to. The results showed that 
there was enough open space between the fire and the occupants that, assuming both the heat flux and 
movement model were correct, the occupants could likely stay away from critical levels of heat flux. 
Figure 27 shows the 1 minute radius of 2.5kW/m2 heat flux compared to the occupants locations. 
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Figure 26: FDS Radiation Transport Solver Results
Figure 27: Heat Flux Tenability Determination
CFAST
Geometry
The CFAST model was two compartments, one with the stage dimensions, which are rectangular, and one 
with the approximated area of the hall and height the average of the distance between the sloped floor and 
sloped ceiling. 
Venting
The four lowest doors, two 72 inch and two 44 inch, were simulated as openings to the outside, and were 
left opened during the simulation. 
Boundaries 
The floors in the CFAST model were turned off. The walls and ceilings were modeled with CFAST’s 
built in library of materials, which includes concrete and gypsum.
Fire
Only the HRR growth was specified in CFAST. Tenability criteria were later calculated based on the fuel 
properties of each scenario.
Tenability Calculations
Optical Density
Visibility for CFAST was calculated using averaged mass optical density properties from the SFPE 
Handbook26 Dm (m2/g). This was entered into the following equation from the SFPE Handbook: 
 
where D is the optical density per meter, and ΔM/Vc is the density of the soot in the mixture. The 
extinction coefficient K = 2.3D. Then visibility for reflective objects is given by 3/K, while visibility for 
light emitting objects is given by 8/K, as found in the SFPE Handbook27. The following calculation is 
used to determine ΔM/Vc: ((HRR*time interval)/(heat of combustion))*soot yield)/(chamber area * layer 
depth). This assumes uniform distribution of soot in the upper layer.  
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Temperature
The reported temperature of both layers in the compartment containing the seating was observed. When 
the upper layer temperature exceeded the tenability criteria, the layer height was checked to determine if 
the occupants would have been exposed to that. The tenability crieteria was assumed to be exceeded if the 
lower layer temperature reached the limit. 
Carbon Monoxide
CO was not accounted for in the CFAST calculations. The molecular weight of the fuels was unknown, so 
the volume fraction of CO could not be directly accounted for. If FDS had shown CO exposure to reach 
the tenability limits before other criteria, then CO could have been calculated by making assumptions 
about the density of the gases in the upper layer. 
Scenario 1
The first scenario is based on NFPA 101 5.5.3.828:
The protection system assumed to fail is the fire curtain. No attempt was made to determine the 
probability of fire curtain failure.  Due to limited resources, only one system could be disabled and fully 
modeled. The author judged that of the passive and active protection systems present in the stage area, the 
fire curtain was the most important in protecting life safety.
Fire
Fuel
An informal survey was conducted to determine the amounts and types of materials that would likely be 
present on stage during a performance. The survey included the Fire Protection Research Foundation 
(FPRF) report “Fire Safety in Theaters – A New Design Approach,29” internet search, the Christopher 
Cohan Center’s technical reference30 detailing available materials, and an interview with a former 
professional stagehand. This survey found that various wood products such as Luan, fiberboard/plywood, 
and lumber are used for structural components such as flats. Cloths, of which Muslin was the most 
popular, were used for drops and other scenery and were generally made from made of cotton, polyester, 
or other unspecified cloths. Some plastics, the specific materials of which were unknown, are used for 
decorations of the scenery and props as well as for lighting equipment. Finally electrical cables for 
lighting and sound are present as well. The technical reference specifies that combustible materials used 
in the production must be treated for flame-retardancy. 
The limiting factor for the design of the fire was the available data for the fuel.  In order to determine the 
time until the tenability criteria is reached, soot fractions, carbon monoxide fractions, and heat release rate 
data was needed. Table 3-4.14 of the SFPE Handbook31 was referenced and a compilation of materials 
likely to be present for which data was available was compiled. The properties of materials were averaged 
together weighted by mass estimated to be present. The woods portion of the compilation is shown in 
Figure 28. The complete set of data is in Appendix D.
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Figure 28: Material Property Demonstration
Material
Net heat of 
combustion 
(kJ/g)
Soot yield 
(g/g)
CO yield 
(g/g)
Radiant 
Fraction
% of total 
by mass
Woods 70.000
red oak 12.4 0.015 0.004 0.371
fir 13.0 0.004 0.377
pine 12.4 0.005 0.298
Fiber board 14.0 0.015
Average of 
known values
12.95 0.015 0.007 0.349
Source: SFPE Handbook Table 3-4.14
Heat Release Rate
Due to the uncertainty of the composition of the fuel and limited data for the known fuel, the heat release 
rate (HRR) was specified as a fast t2 growing fire based on figure 3.7.2 in the NFPA Handbook (Figure
29). Luan is a thin type of plywood, and much of the combustible materials will be in a vertical 
orientation, so the author judged that a fast t2 fire would be a conservative choice for the growth rate. 
To determine the maximum size of the stage fire, the simulation was run in FDS to determine the 
activation times of the sprinklers and the gravity vents. The calculation below32 was used to determine the 
activation times for the sprinklers.
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Figure 29: Fire Growth Rate Determination
Where μ is the gas velocity in (m/s), RTI is the response time index, Tg is the gas temperature, Tl is the 
temperature of the sprinkler bulb, C1 is the C factor for conduction, and Tm is mount temperature, which 
was assumed to be constant and equal to the ambient temperature33. 
Based on the construction documents, the sprinklers on both the gridiron and at the ceiling are 200°F 
(93°C) ordinary response sprinklers. RTI values for the sprinklers were estimated at 135 (m*s)^(1/2) and C 
factors of 0.5 and 0.65 were used34. 
The calculation below was used to determine the activation times for the gravity vents.
Where RTIb = the bulk RTI, and accounts for the C factor used in the conduction portion of the equation. 
RTIb values for the fusible link were estimated to be 167 to 180 (m*s)^(1/2)35.  
The activation times were calculated by computing dTl at each FDS time step with dt = to the difference 
between the current and previous time step. dTl was added to Tl of the previous time step to give the value 
of Tl for the current time step. Table 7 shows a sample of these calculations, while Table 8 shows the 
results.
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Table 7: Element Temperature Example
s C m/s RTI 135.00
FDS 
Time THCP -70,25 velocity -70,25 T element (°C) dT (°C)
118.83 27.40 1.60 21.89 0.04
119.73 27.03 1.91 21.93 0.04
120.63 27.04 1.03 21.97 0.03
121.52 27.74 2.81 21.99 0.06
122.41 28.50 2.33 22.05 0.06
123.31 28.84 2.14 22.10 0.06
124.22 29.09 2.13 22.16 0.06
125.12 28.68 2.07 22.22 0.06
126.01 29.49 1.99 22.27 0.06
126.93 29.64 2.08 22.33 0.07
127.82 28.99 2.17 22.39 0.06
128.70 29.43 2.26 22.44 0.07
129.62 29.54 1.96 22.50 0.06
130.51 29.37 1.75 22.56 0.05
131.40 29.53 2.29 22.61 0.07
132.33 30.02 2.78 22.67 0.08
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Table 8: Activation Times of Protection Devices
Object Activation 
Time (s)
Fusible Link, RTI = 167, 7m from fire 490
Fusible Link, RTI = 180, 7m from fire 493
Sprinkler, RTI = 135 (m*s) (^1/2), C = 0.65, 
7m from fire
513
Sprinkler, RTI = 135 (m*s) (^1/2), C = 0.5, 7m 
from fire
503
Fusible Link, RTI = 167, Directly over the fire 429
Fusible Link, RTI = 180, Directly over the fire 433
Sprinkler, RTI = 135 (m*s) (^1/2), C = 0.65, 
Directly over the fire
451
Sprinkler, RTI = 135 (m*s) (^1/2), C = 0.5, 
Directly over the fire
444
The results indicate that if the sprinklers and gravity vent fusible links are in the same location, the gravity 
vents will activate 10 to 23 seconds earlier then the sprinklers, essentially the same time. This result is 
supported by a referenced study, which also concluded that when sprinklers operate before the smoke 
vents, “the significant cooling effect of sprinkler sprays on the near-ceiling gas flow often prevented the 
automatic operation of vents.36”  The study also concludes that when the fire is not activated directly 
under the roof vent, the venting has no significant effect on sprinkler activation times, and if the fire was 
directly under the vent, the first sprinkler and vent activated at about the same time, but the average first 
ring of sprinklers activation time was delayed.
Therefore, the HRR used in the model is a fast t2 growth until 450 seconds (about 9.5MW), after which 
the HRR is steady at 9.5MW. This approach assumes that a sprinkler is more likely to activate first then 
one of the smoke vents, and that even if a smoke vent did activate first, the sprinklers would eventually 
activate. It was also judged by the author that the conservative assumption is for the smoke vent to not 
operate, as operation would slow the accumulation of smoke in the occupied chamber and increase the 
ASET. This also assumes that the sprinklers are capable of controlling the fire, even though they are 80 ft 
above the base of the fire (the stage). The top of the ignitable materials, such as the drops, may be as high 
as 60 ft, so wetting of potential fuel may occur as well. 
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Fire Location
The location of the fire was chosen to be at stage level, toward the front of the stage, see Figure 30.
The location was chosen at stage level because a referenced study indicated that this delayed the 
activation of the fire protection systems37, and so was judged to be the conservative choice.  The distance 
from the proscenium arch was chosen based on observation of a performance. The fire represents a visual 
estimate of the closest a piece of substantial scenery was deployed to the proscenium arch. The offset 
from the center line of the stage was to determine if the offset had any observable effects on one side of 
the room as opposed to the other. 
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Figure 30: Scenario 1 Fire Location
Scenario 2
Fuel
This scenario calls for an ultra-fast growing fire in the primary exit. This will simulate an arson scenario. 
The model will assume 1 gallon of hydrocarbon38, meant to represent a commonly available liquid fuel 
such as gasoline, as the initial combustion source. It is assumed to ignite the seats before it is consumed. 
The seats are then the combustible materials.
HRR
The HRR is specified as an ultra-fast growing fire. Its burnout time was calculated by multiplying the 
HRR calculated each second for an ultra-fast growing fire to a time interval of 1 second, and dividing by 
the heat of combustion. By tabulating that value, the grams of fuel consume were summed, until they 
equaled the mass contained 1 galleon of the hydrocarbon. Burnout was calculated at 150s. 
After this, the same HRR was assumed to continue, but with a growth rate of a medium t2 fire, based on 
upholstered furniture entry in 59from the NFPA Handbook.
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Figure 31: Fire Growth Rate Determination
Fire Location
The fire was set in the 72 inch door on the right side, if facing the stage from the seating area (Figure 32. 
The side was arbitrarily chosen. The fire was located in the aisle, near the seats to simulate the spread of 
fire to the seats while still blocking the primary exit. It will be assumed that the fire is in a location such 
that the plum deters occupants on the balcony and gallery from using the exits to the two hour stairway.
Venting
In order to prevent pressurization, vents are needed in the model. The vertical mesh edges outside the 
seating section of the model were open vents. 
This scenario specifies that all doors are opened initially. Again, the exits were modeled to close after the 
estimated movement time.  In this scenario, the primary door is propped opened. However, that door leads 
into a 1 hr vestibule that separates it from the 1 hour corridor that the 44 inch doors exit into Figure 33. 
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Figure 32: Scenario 2 Fire Location
The doors are held by magnetic door holders and will close upon automatic or manual activation of the 
fire alarm. The 1 hour vestibule has a smoke detector in it, as do all the other corridors leading from the 
hall, and the space between the single 44 inch door and the double doors leading into the East Gallery, so 
it was assumed that either an occupant would trigger the alarm, or eventual smoke passage through the 
doors will trigger the door holder release. These events would be difficult to predict, but the doors will 
have to open to admit occupants, which is an easier period to predict.
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Figure 33: Compartmentalization of the Means of Egress
Results
Visibility
The graphs of the layer heights and visibility, the first criteria to exceed the tenability limits, are shown in 
Figures 34 through 37.
62
Figure 34: CFAST Layer Height and Visibility for Scenario 1, Gallery Level
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Figure 35: FDS Layer Height and Visibility for Scenario 1, Gallery Level
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Figure 36: CFAST Layer and Visibility for Scenario 2, Gallery Level
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Figure 37: FDS Layer and Visibility for Scenario 2, Gallery Level
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Carbon Monoxide
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Figure 38: FDS Carbon Monoxide Results for Scenario 1
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Figure 39: FDS Carbon Monoxide Results for Scenario 2
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Summary of Results
Table 9: Summary of Tenability Results for Scenario 1
Scenario 1
Criteria and Location RSET (minutes) CFAST ASET (minutes) FDS ASET (minutes)
Margin 
CFAST 
(minutes)
Margin 
FDS 
(minutes)
Layer Gallery 1.4 3.8 7 2.4 5.6
Visibility Gallery 1.4 4.2 10.5 2.8 9.1
Visibility Floor 2.6 8.7 > 16.5 6.1 > 13.9
Temp Gallery 1.4 9.7 13.9 8.3 12.5
Temp Floor 2.6 9.7 > 16.5 7.1 > 13.9
CO Gallery 1.4  13.6  12.2
CO Floor 2.6  16.2  13.6
Table 10: Summary of Tenability Results for Scenario 2
Scenario 2
Criteria and Location RSET (minutes) CFAST ASET (minutes) FDS ASET (minutes)
Margin 
CFAST 
(minutes)
Margin 
FDS 
(minutes)
Layer Gallery 1.5 1.2 2.4 -0.3 0.9
Visibility Gallery 1.5 3.2 7.3 1.7 5.8
Visibility Floor 3.9 7.3 > 17 3.4 > 13.1
Temp Gallery 1.5 4 11.1 2.5 9.6
Temp Floor 3.9 7.3 > 17 3.4 > 13.1
CO Gallery 1.5  9.7  8.2
CO Floor 3.9  > 17  > 13.1
Heat flux was not an issue based on Lawson and Quintieres' point source radiation model compared to a 
modified Pathfinder evacuation simulation.
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Discussion
CFAST vs. FDS
CFAST does not account for transport time, making it a very conservative choice, especially for scenarios 
such as the first one, where the smoke must travel across the entire theater. This is illustrated in Figure 40. 
CFAST is probably conservative for the second scenario as well. Without proper sensitivity studies, such 
as grid resolution, it is unknown how well FDS is predicting the results. A number between the results 
provided by both models will be assumed as the actual criteria time. 
Scenario 1
The first criteria to be reached for both scenarios is the visibility at the gallery level.  For scenario 1, the 
margin is between 2.8 and 9.1. This does not account for detection or pre-movement. The fire may be 
difficult to detect initially, because smoke or fog effects may be present on stage.  At 2.5 minutes, a fast t2 
fire has an HRR of about 1 MW. This is a substantial fire that should be detected by the occupants. This 
leaves at least the difference between CFAST and FDS for pre-movement and the difference between the 
predicted and actual movement time. If FDS is accurate, then the gallery occupants will probably have 
escaped before the layer descends to 6 feet above the highest seating level. 
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Figure 40: Stage Layer Height Comparison Between CFAST and FDS
Layer Height Comparison
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 120 240 360 480 600
Time (s)
H
ei
gh
t (
m
)
FDS Layer Height CFAST Layer Height
Scenario 2
In scenario 2, the smoke layer has potentially reached 6 ft above the gallery level with occupants still 
there or with less then 1 minute to spare. The visibility leaves between 1.7 and 5.8 minutes. This scenario 
is modeled after an arson situation, so the detection time could be very small. As shown in Figure 41 and 
Figure 42, the transport time in this scenario may be relatively small compared to the margin. If the 
entrainment rate and soot density is closer to the CFAST prediction then the FDS prediction, then this 
margin is probably too small given other uncertainties in the model. As an example, occupants tend to 
slow down as they encounter smoke39, which is possible given the negative to small margin time before 
smoke layer decent. Evacuation then takes longer, and it becomes more likely that the tenability criteria 
are reached while occupants are still present. 
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Figure 41: Scenario 2 at 22 seconds
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Figure 42: Scenario 2 at 70 seconds
Conclusions
For scenario 1, the occupants seem likely to escape before tenability requirements are met. 
For scenario 2, it is possible that some occupants will be exposed to dangerous conditions. Probability 
studies of the scenarios were not performed, so it is difficult to assess if something should be changed to 
account for the possibility of scenario 2. 
ASET could be increased for scenario 2 by retrofitting the main seating area with a smoke control system. 
Alternatively,  administrative controls such as security checks of belongings could be implemented. 
There are many unexplored uncertainties in the models including: 
• HVAC effects
• Occupant characteristics
• Grid sensitivity
• Fire location sensitivity
• Effect of the decorative ceiling on smoke flow
• Effect of timing of opening and closing of exit doors 
• Effect of fuel properties used in the models
Due to this, it is recommended that a more detailed study into the models and scenarios be completed 
before any actions are taken. 
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Appendix A – Hydraulic Calculations
The sprinklers above the stage are fed by the north-eastern riser, and as the highest elevation sprinklers 
are 91ft above the riser base. The stage and orchestra pit have the highest hazard classifications in the 
building, ordinary hazard group 2, and so they have the highest discharge densities of 0.20gpm/ft2. 
Therefore, these are the most hydraulically remote sprinklers. 
The branchlines are connected to the crossmain by Ts on 6” nipples. 
The design area is 1500ft2. The maximum sprinkler coverage is listed as 130ft2. This particular area has 
sprinkler coverage areas ranging from 113ft2 to 128ft2. The smaller value of 113ft2 is used for 
1500ft2/113ft2 = 13.3, which rounds up to 14 heads. Per NFPA 13 22.4.4.1.1.1, the length of the 
rectangle side parallel to the branch lines must be at least 1.2 * (1500)^1/2 = 46.5ft. However, the longest 
branch line is only 32ft long, including sprinklers on both sides of the cross main, so the calculation area 
will be adjusted back along the crossmain until 14 sprinklers are covered. This area is illustrated below. 
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The sprinklers are Viking model M, ½” with K-factors of 5.5. The hydraulic calculations are shown 
below. According to the calculations 75.5psi at 372.7gpm is required at the base of the riser. Based on the 
flow test and the hydraulic graph below, there is quite a bit of spare water capacity in the supply. 
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Project name: FPE 523 PAC Date: 7-Jun-11
Step 
No.
Pipe 
size, 
actual ID 
(in)
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
1 1 BL1 B q 23.2 1.38 L 7.92 C= 120 Pt 17.82 Pt q1 = 23.22
F Pe Pv
Q 23.2 T 7.92 pf 0.05 Pf 0.4 Pn A = 116.10
2 2 BL1B q 23.5 1.38 L 7.92 C= 120 Pt 18.18 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F Pe Pv k= 5.5
Q 46.7 T 7.92 pf 0.16 Pf 1.3 Pn
3 3 BL1B q 24.3 1.38 L 7.92 C= 120 Pt 19.48 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F Pe Pv k= 5.5
Q 70.9 T 7.92 pf 0.36 Pf 2.8 Pn
4 4 BL1B q 26.0 1.61 T - 6 L 7.04 C= 120 Pt 22.30 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F 6 Pe Pv k= 5.5
Q 96.9 T 13.04 pf 0.30 Pf 3.9 Pn
5 BL1B q 0.0 L C= 120 Pt 26.21 Pt k eq= Q/Pt^1/2
K EQ F Pe Pv k eq = 18.93
Q 96.9 T pf Pf 26.2 Pn
6 BL1T q 23.7 1.049 T - 5 L 1 C= 120 Pt 18.60 Pt q = 23.72
F 5 Pe Pv
Q 23.7 T 6 pf 0.18 Pf 1.1 Pn A = 118.60
7 BL1T q 0.0 L C= 120 Pt 19.67 Pt k eq= Q/Pt^1/2
K EQ F Pe Pv k eq = 5.35
Q 23.7 T pf Pf 19.7 Pn
8 BL1T q 27.4 L C= Pt 26.21 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F Pe Pv k= 5.35
Q 124.3 T pf Pf Pn
9 RN q 124.3 3.068 T - 15 L 0.5 C= 120 Pt 26.21 Pt
DN F 15 e 0.500 Pe 0.22 Pv
Q 124.3 T 15.5 pf 0.02 Pf 0.3 Pn
10 BL1 q 0.0 L C= Pt 26.74 Pt k eq= Q/Pt^1/2
K EQ F Pe Pv k eq = 24.04
Q 124.3 T pf Pf Pn
11 1 q 25.6 1.38 L 10.25 C= 120 Pt 21.71 Pt q1 = 25.625
F Pe Pv
Q 25.6 T 10.25 pf 0.05 Pf 0.6 Pn A = 128.13
12 2 q 26.0 1.38 L 10.25 C= 120 Pt 22.26 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F Pe Pv k= 5.5
Q 51.6 T 10.25 pf 0.20 Pf 2.0 Pn
13 3 q 27.1 1.61 T - 8 L 9.83 C= 120 Pt 24.29 Pt q = k * Pt^1/2
F 8 Pe Pv k= 5.5
Q 78.7 T 17.83 pf 0.20 Pf 3.6 Pn
14 q 0.0 L C= 120 Pt 27.92 Pt k eq= Q/Pt^1/2
K EQ F Pe Pv k eq = 14.89
Q 78.7 T pf Pf 27.9 Pn
15 q 24.6 1.049 T - 5 L 0.542 C= 120 Pt 19.97 Pt q = 24.58
F 5 Pe Pv
Q 24.6 T 5.542 pf 0.19 Pf 1.1 Pn A = 122.90
16 q 0.0 L C= 120 Pt 21.03 Pt k eq= Q/Pt^1/2
K EQ F Pe Pv k eq = 5.36
Q 24.6 T pf Pf 21.0 Pn
Pt1 = (q/k)^2, q1 = A * D
Pt1 = (q/k)^2, q = A * D
Correct for 
pressure
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
Sprinkler K-factor = 5.5. 
Density = 0.2gpm/ft^2       
Nozzle 
Ident and 
Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe 
Length
Friction 
loss (psi/ft)
Pt1 = (q/k)^2, q1 = A * DBL2,3 B
BL2,3 B
BL2,3 B
BL2,3 B
Pt1 = (q/k)^2, q = A * D
BL2,3 T
BL2,3 T
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Appendix B – Inspection, Testing, and 
Maintenance
Sprinklers
An annual visual inspection from the ground is required. During the inspection, check sprinklers for leaks, 
corrosion, non-factory paint, damage, drained bulbs, insufficient clearance, and incorrect orientation. Presence of 
the supply of extra sprinklers and a wrench for each type of sprinkler needs to be verified. The PAC must maintain 
at least 12 SSP 155 5.5 sprinklers, and 6 each of all other sprinkler types. Concealed sprinklers are exempt from the 
visual inspection. 
The ordinary response sprinklers will have to be replaced or 1 percent of each type will have to be sent to a lab 
approved by the AHJ for testing after 50 years of service, which will be in 2046 for the PAC. The quick response 
sprinklers have a 20 year life before they must be tested, which will occur in 2016. 
If damage is found, the sprinklers must be replaced as needed with new sprinklers having the proper 
characteristics for the protected area.  Additionally, maintenance as indicated by Table 5.5.1 may be 
required if other parts of the system are serviced. 
Pipes and Pipe Fittings
A visual inspection of pipes and fittings must be performed annual. The inspection takes place from the 
floor, and the inspector looks for damage, leaks, corrosion, and objects resting on or suspended from the 
supply pipes. Concealed pipes are exempt from the visual inspection.
Any damage must be addressed. Additionally, maintenance as indicated by Table 5.5.1 may be required if 
other parts of the system are serviced.
Water-flow Alarms
A visual inspection of the alarm devices for damage must be performed. Associated alarm valves must be 
visually inspected monthly for damage, leaks, and proper pressure indicated on gauges. The valves must 
also be internally inspected every 5 years and their condition ascertained. 
These devices must be tested semi-annually by opening the test connection and verifying the alarm 
activates within specifications. 
The alarms and valves must be cleaned, repaired, or replaced as necessary. Additionally, maintenance as 
indicated by Table 5.5.1 may be required if other parts of the system are serviced.
Hose Connections and Standpipe System
This system requires an annual visual inspection for missing parts, damage, leaks, and obstructions. A 
flow test is required every 5 years as well. 
Damaged or missing parts must be repaired or replaced as needed according to Table 6.2.2 in NFPA 25. 
Additionally, maintenance as indicated by Table 6.5.1 may be required if other parts of the system are 
serviced.
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Control Valves
A monthly visual inspection of the control valves must be performed to check that the valves are locked, 
in the correct position, accessible, leak free, and have proper identification. 
Each valve must be moved through its full range annually. 
Control valves must be cleaned and repaired as necessary. OS&Y valve stems must be lubricated 
annually. 
Fire Department Connections
A quarterly visual inspection must be performed to check for damage, identification signs, leaks, and 
missing parts. 
The connections are to be tested, adjusted, repaired, or replaced according to Table 6.2.2. If other system 
components are serviced, maintenance may be required by Table 6.5.1. 
Check Valves
A monthly visual inspection for damage and leaks must be performed. Every 5 years, an internal 
inspection must be performed. The valves must be cleaned, repaired, or replaced as necessary.
Pipe Hangers and Bracing
A visual inspection from the floor for damage or loosed part must be made annually. Concealed hangers 
and braces are exempt. 
Damaged or loose components must be replaced or refastened as necessary. If other system components 
have been serviced, the hangers and braces must be checked for conformance with NFPA 13.
Valve Tamper Switches
A visual inspection for damage must be performed quarterly. A semi-annual test must be performed to 
verify the device sends a signal when appropriate and stops once the valve is returned to proper position.
Additionally, maintenance as indicated by Table 5.5.1 may be required if other parts of the system are 
serviced.
Pressure Gauges
A monthly visual inspection for proper pressure and gauge condition must be performed. 
Every 5 years, gauges must be replaced or tested to verify that they are within three percent of the 
maximum gauge value. 
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Gauges must be replaced as needed, and may require re-verification as warranted by Table 5.5.1. 
Hydraulic Nameplate
The nameplate’s legibility and proper placement must be verified visually quarterly.  It must be repaired 
or replaced as necessary. 
Backflow Preventer
A monthly visual inspection is required to ensure the isolation valves are in the correct position and the 
relief port is not continually discharging. Additional inspection is required after any testing or repair. 
Forward flow and backflow performance tests are required annually. Rubber parts must be replaced as 
scheduled by the AHJ or manufacturer. 
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Appendix C – Product Literature
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Appendix D – Fuel Properties
Table 11: Scenario 1 Fuel Properties
Source: SFPE Handbook Table 3-4.14 SFPE HB Table 2-13.5
Material
Net heat of 
combustion 
(kJ/g)
Soot yield 
(g/g)
CO yield 
(g/g)
Radiant 
Fraction
% of total by 
mass Dm (m^2/g)
Woods 70.000
Red oak 12.4 0.015 0.004 0.371
Fir 13.0  0.004 0.377
Pine 12.4  0.005 0.298  
Fiber board 14.0  0.015    
Average of known 
values 12.95 0.015 0.007 0.349  0.280
       
Cloths     20.000  
Polyester 1 20.600 0.091 0.070 0.476   
Poly 2 19.500 0.089 0.080    
nylon 27.100 0.075 0.038 0.399   
polyester-
polyamide 20.200  0.008 0.485   
Average of known 
values 21.850 0.085 0.049 0.437   
       
Rigid plastics     7.000  
PE 38.400 0.060 0.024 0.432   
PP 38.600 0.059 0.024 0.000   
Polycarbonate 18.400 0.112 0.054    
Average of known 
values 31.800 0.077 0.034 0.216  0.530
       
Electrical cables     3.000  
1.000 31.300 0.076 0.100 0.629   
2.000 25.100 0.115 0.050 0.558   
3.000 24.000  0.048 0.458   
4.000 22.000  0.166 0.368   
5.000 20.900 0.139 0.147 0.488   
Average of known 
values 24.660 0.110 0.102 0.500   
       
Fuel Properties 
Weighted 
Average
16.401 0.036 0.020 0.362  0.303
Table 12: Scenario 2 Fuel Properties
Source: SFPE Handbook Table 3-4.14 SFPE HB Table 2-13.5
Material
Net heat of 
combustion 
(kJ/g)
Soot 
yield 
(g/g)
CO 
yield 
(g/g)
Radiant 
Fraction
% of total by 
mass Dm (m^2/g)
Hydrocarbon 43.900 0.059 0.019 0.336 50.000  
       
PU       
gm21 26.200 0.131 0.010 0.517   
gm23 27.200 0.227 0.031 0.458   
gm25 24.600 0.194 0.028 0.576   
gm27 23.200 0.198 0.042 0.537   
Average 25.300 0.188 0.028 0.522  0.275
       
red oak 12.400 0.015 0.004 0.371   
fir 13.000  0.004 0.377   
pine 12.400  0.005 0.298   
Average 12.600 0.015 0.004 0.349  0.280
       
Total Chair 
Properties 18.950 0.101 0.016 0.435 50.000  
Fuel Properties 31.425 0.080 0.018 0.386  0.278
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